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Taxes, Transfers, Labor Supply and
Household Welfare*
11.1 MOTIVATIONS FOR STUDYING LABOR SUPPLY
AND TAXATION
There are important links between female labor supply and taxes. First, income
taxation affects labor supply. Also, labor supply generates the basis for tax rev-
enue. Secondly, married women are the most responsive component of the labor
force with respect to changes in incentives. As we illustrate in this chapter, their
behavior turns out to be crucial in designing and evaluating tax-transfer policies.
Taxes are collected in order to finance government spending. Many trends
contribute to increasing demand for government spending. The fact that
individuals are living longer, and that cohorts born in the late 1940s and 1950s
were rather large, imply that in the coming decades there will be an increasing
number of ageing individuals. In addition to the expected increase in govern-
ment spending on pensions, one should also expect a sharp increase in the
government spending on a variety of health issues, ranging from hospital ser-
vices, elderly homes and pharmaceuticals. Disability pensions and unemploy-
ment benefits are two other government programs that have increased recent
government spending in EU-countries due to high and persistent unemploy-
ment over many years. In recent years there has thus been a growing concern in
western societies regarding the increase in government spending and hence
about the costs of taxation, that is to say, the loss in efficiency due to disin-
centives and distortions on worker behavior caused by taxation. The perceived
disincentives on labor supply appeared to be the major justification for reduc-
ing marginal tax rates in many European nations during the 1980s and the early
1990s where the marginal tax rates faced by top earners dropped from 70–80
per cent to around 40–50 per cent (see e.g. Blundell, 1996).
Taxes and transfers are also implemented with the direct aim of changing
incentives and distribution of resources. There is a growing interest in
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reforming the welfare system, or the various institutions devoted to supporting
incomes or the consumption of disadvantaged households. While this last issue
is in principle distinct, there is an obvious connection with the former: both call
for a redesign of the ‘tax-and-benefit’ system with the aim of implementing a
new configuration of incentives that could eventually lead to more efficiency—
not more inequality, given total tax revenue.
In order to be able to undertake tax reforms that enhance the efficiency of
the economy, one needs to know how taxes and transfers affect behavior.
Here we will concentrate on labor supply. Labor supply consists of parti-
cipation and hours worked in the labor market, given participation. Eco-
nomists assume that individuals make their labor supply choice based on
preferences that depend on the outcome of working, that is, earnings, and
foregone leisure. Preferences can be represented by a function that increases
with income and leisure (the utility function). It is assumed that individuals
choose their labor supply so that utility is maximised, given a budget constraint
and given their perceived opportunities in the labor market. The budget
constraint transforms time allocated to labor into, and then—through the tax
rule—gross income into net income.
Most of the individuals are married or cohabiting. Therefore, to address the
labor supply decisions in a population properly, we have to account for the
interaction between spouses. Thus in most cases below the ‘utility function’
relates to households with household consumption and leisure of the spouses as
the main arguments in the utility function.
Most tax reforms involve a change in marginal tax rates. As a first
approximation, reform effects can be discussed in terms of labor supply
responses to changes in marginal tax rates. A reduction in marginal tax rates,
for example, has two opposing effects on labor supply. First, lower tax rates on
the margin makes it more profitable to supply more labor. This is called the
substitution effect of tax rate changes. Secondly, lower tax rates make it pos-
sible to reduce labor supply and still enjoy the same level of consumption. This
is called the income effect of tax rate changes. It is the net of these two effects
that determine whether a cut in tax rates may increase labor supply. Substi-
tution and income effects vary across households, depending on their taste for
leisure and how interesting and challenging their jobs are, on their economic
situation before taxes are changed, and whether the jobs they have, or can
move to, are flexible enough to meet their preferences for working longer
hours. An important part of empirical labor supply is to identify those indi-
viduals who are the most responsive to tax rate changes. If the top earners are
the most responsive ones, then tax reforms should be targeted at cutting tax
rates at the top. However, many of those having high wage incomes often
occupy jobs from which they derive a lot more than income. They work long
hours because they may enjoy their jobs. Thus, their responses to economic
incentives are weakened. Tax reforms must take this into account. If the
enhancement of efficiency is the main concern of the authorities, they must
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target the tax cuts towards those who respond most strongly to economic
incentives, not necessarily cutting tax rates for the individuals paying the
highest marginal tax rates.
Economists tend to picture the trade-off between equality and efficiency as
inescapable. In a widely used textbook in public economics, Stiglitz (1986,
p. 481), the reader is warned that the price of redistributing income is a loss in
economic efficiency. If this is true, then tax reforms that enhance the efficiency
of the economy will imply more inequality. However, if high-income earners
are less responsive than low-income earners to economic incentives, then a tax
reform that enhances efficiency and reduces inequality may be available. To get
an adequate answer to this question, a microeconometric empirical analysis is
required.
11.2 SOME EVIDENCE IN EUROPE AND THE US
There have been numerous studies of the impact of tax reforms on labor supply
in the United States and the United Kingdom. In most of these studies male
workers are found to respond very little to changes in tax rates, while the labor
supply of married women and lone mothers are found to be far more
responsive, Pencavel (1986), Blundell (1997), Blundell, Duncan and Meghir
(1998) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). We can look at the labor supply
decision as consisting of two steps: the ‘participation’ decision, that is to say,
the decision whether to work (or look for work), and the hours decision, that
is to say how much to work, conditional on participation. Of these two
choices, participation tends to be the most responsive to changes in economic
incentives.
Most of the males in the relevant age intervals are participating in the
labor market, while in many countries the labor market participation among
married women has been rather low. For married women the reasons are
twofold. In the first place, to take care of small children implies that less
time can be devoted to working outside the home. How difficult it is to com-
bine the raising of children and participation in labor market activities,
depends on the availability of childcare centers, maternity leave programs
and the wage level of child carers in private markets. In the United States
and the United Kingdom there are fewer childcare centers and the maternity
leave is less generous than in the Scandinavian countries. Thus, as we should
expect, the labor market participation of married women in the United States
and the United Kingdom has been less than in the Scandinavian countries, but
higher than in countries like Italy and France. The reasons for the latter
could be cultural, or the fact that the wage structure is even less in the
United States and the United Kingdom. The latter may imply that the wage
level of a nanny is so low compared to the wage that the married women can get
that she can afford to hire a nanny and participate in the labor market. It should
be noted that the change in fertility in Europe would make the female labor
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force more like the male labor force in Europe. Thus in the coming years
the whole labor force in Europe will most likely become less responsive to
changes in tax rates.
The second reason why the married female labor market participation is
lower than among males is the role of the husband as the main breadwinner
with a higher potential income than the female. The higher the income is that
the married female can enjoy without working, the less the probability is that
she will work. This is due to the income effect in labor supply.
Lone mothers’ labor market participation is negatively affected by having
small children they have to look after. Moreover, the government benefit paid
to lone mothers may have a strong negative impact on labor supply, at least in
Europe, and including the United Kingdom. For many people, a reduction in
government benefit if they are working, comes at the top of a marginal tax on
wage income. Thus the effective marginal tax is much higher than the ordinary
marginal tax rate, and the disincentive to participate in labor market activities
is rather strong, Walker (1990).
Although there are strong disincentives to participate in the labor market
activities among married women and lone mothers, there is of course room for
increasing labor supply in these groups provided that the improvement in the
economic incentives are strong enough. It should be noted that males and
females approaching the retirement age also are facing a discrete labor market
choice, namely to continue working or to retire. Hence, we should expect
individuals in these age groups to be more responsive to changes in economic
incentives than younger individuals.
Devanzo et al. (1973) was one of the first studies to point out that most of the
wage- and income-responsiveness in labor supply was concentrated at, or near,
zero hours of work. Later studies on the labor supply of married women both in
the United States and the United Kingdom gave strong support to this finding,
Borjas and Heckman, (1978); Cogan (1981); Hausman and Ruud (1984);
Blundell et al. (1988); Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990) and Dickens and
Lundberg (1993).
The tax policy reforms in the United Kingdom in the 1980s raised the
marginal tax rate for some individuals, reduced it for others, while some were
not exposed to any change at all. These reforms provide the researchers with
good opportunities for studying the impact of tax reforms on labor supply. On
repeated cross-sections set covering the period 1978–1992, with a focus on
married women and with employed husbands, Blundell et al. (1998) estimated
the impact of these tax reforms on female labor supply. Results are reported in
the form of ‘after-tax-wage’ elasticities. The authors conclude that although the
uncompensated wage elasticities are smaller than the wage elasticities reported
for US women, they are moderately sized and clearly significantly different
from zero. Income elasticities are estimated to be negative, and the compens-
ated elasticities are thus positive and high enough to lead to the following
conclusion: ‘Our conclusion is that major tax reform should take into account
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behavioral effects since our compensated elasticities suggest that the welfare
effects are not eligible.’
An important issue to consider is how changes in economic incentives affect
labor supply for individuals with different potential income. The higher the
wage rate, the higher one would expect that the potential income would be,
and/or is. One of the first to study this problem was Break (1957). Based on
interviews with a group of lawyers and accountants in the United Kingdom he
found that the majority of these affluent men were not affected in their labor
supply by the strong disincentives embedded in the British tax system at the
time. Across the Atlantic, Moffit and Wilhelm (1998) found similar weak
effects of a tax reform in 1986 on the labor supply of the affluent American
men. The authors found no evidence of change in hours of work in response to
the marginal tax rate cuts in the 1986 reform. On US data, Dickens and
Lundberg (1993) report that labor supply responds more strongly to changes in
economic incentives in households with low income than in households with
high income. For the households with the highest income, they report that the
labor supply curve is even backward bending.
Notwithstanding the above reservations on lowering the marginal tax rates
on high incomes, this choice has prevailed in the United States, the United
Kingdom and most of Europe. Besides the (dubious) efficiency motivations,
there might of course be other good reasons for flattening the marginal rates
profile, such as simplifications, reducing incentives to evade taxes, coping with
mobility of highly-skilled labor and fiscal competition. Given that choice, in the
last decade, has been taken for granted policy and research focus has shifted
towards more finely-tuned issues such as redesigning the mechanisms for low-
income support, strengthening the incentives to work for the poor, and
reconciling work and childbearing (e.g. Duncan and McCrae1999; Keane
1995; Eissa and Liebman 1996; Blundel 2000). Overall, the results of these
studies confirm that behavioral responses—and particularly those from mar-
ried women—are strong enough to get some efficiency and/or equality return
from the effort spent in redesigning incentives and institutions. Some repres-
entative studies and their results are summarized in Table 11.1.
11.3 FISCAL AND SOCIAL POLICIES: MODELING THE
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES
Most of the empirical and policy analysis of labor supply and taxes up until
the beginning of the nineties are very close to the textbook presentation of
the labor supply decision. The consumer commands a fixed wage rate on the
labor market, which reflects her marginal productivity. She is free to choose
any number of hours of work at that wage. She satisfies her needs by combining
earned income (þ eventually other incomes from different sources, e.g. trans-
fers) with ‘leisure’ time (i.e. the time not sold on the market). She chooses the
allocation of time that best meets her needs or preferences. The empirical model
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at this point consists in specifying a functional relationship between the labor
supply decision on the one hand, and wage rate and other incomes on the other:
h¼ h(w, y). With observations on h, w and y, one can estimate this function
and use it to simulate new decisions given new values of w and/or y. Taxes
complicate the picture but the basic framework does not change. However the
same framework imposes serious limitations. For example not all the tax rules
can be easily represented. Simultaneous household decisions are cumbersome
to model. The same holds for modeling constraints as for choice of hours.
During the last two decades, a different framework has become more
popular, where the consumer is assumed to choose among jobs (i.e. ‘packages’
of hours requirements, wages and other characteristics), rather than along
a continuum of hours for a fixed wage rate. Also, the empirical analysis
consists in directly estimating the preferences as revealed by the observed
choices, rather than going through the specification of a ‘labor supply
function’. This different approach accounts for the fundamental heterogeneity
of the alternative job packages that form the consumer’s opportunity set,
and simplifies enormously the representation of complex tax rules, of simul-
taneous household decisions and of constraints on hour choices.1 In most of
this chapter we rely on a modeling framework that belongs to this approach. In
particular it is a simultaneous model of household labor supply of both
spouses, it allows an exact representation of the budget sets independent of
how complex they are, and it accounts for quantity constraints and limitations
in the choice of hours of work. An outline of this modeling framework is
provided in Appendix A.2
11.4 MEASURING SOCIAL WELFARE: EFFICIENCY
AND EQUALITY
In order to choose between alternative tax policies, one needs a criterion
for aggregating household incomes, or welfare, into social welfare. Using
household welfare rather than income as the informational basis of the
social welfare function means that not only income but also the value of
leisure are taken into account. A social welfare function is essentially a
weighted sum of individual households’ incomes or welfare indexes, where
the weights reflect the social (e.g. the planner’s) attitude towards inequality.
For example, if the planner cares at all about inequality, she/he should
give more weight to the poor than to the rich. The particular form of social
1 The foundations of this new approach reside in McFadden’s work on discrete choice (e.g.
Manski and McFadden, 1981). Important extensions are Ben-Akiva and Watanatada (1981) and
Dagsvik (1994).
2 An interesting recent development consists in representing the household as a set of agents
that bargains or plays some sort of game, rather than acting as a unit of decision. The empirical
implementation of these models is more problematic. Among others, examples are provided by
Hearnes et al. (2003) and Chiuri and Longobardi (2002).
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welfare function that we use is such that it can be expressed as the product
of an efficiency index (namely the simple average of individual incomes
or welfare levels), times an index of equality (closely related to the well-
known Gini inequality index):
Social Welfare ¼ Efficiency  Equality
As a consequence, the effect of a given policy upon social welfare can be
approximately expressed as:
% Variation in Social Welfare ¼ % Variation in Efficiency
þ% Variation in Equality
Instead of using the total (or average) amount of income or welfare as a
measure of efficiency, one might want to use different criteria. Recently, cri-
teria inspired by the ‘equality-of-opportunity’ philosophy have been
developed. The idea is that in weighting individual incomes or welfare levels
one should care only about that part of inequality that is due to different
exogenous opportunities, and not to the residual part due to, say, different
effort. According to the approach proposed by J. Roemer (1993, 1998), for
example, it turns out that the equality-of-opportunity criterion essentially
amounts to using the average income or welfare among the least favored
(opportunity-wise, e.g. those with lowest parental income or education) as the
efficiency index: the implications being using the standard concept of efficiency
versus the equality-of-opportunity concept as developed by J. Roemer. In what
follows, we will present simulation exercises where alternative policies are
ranked according to their effects on efficiency and on equality. More details on
the computation and use of efficiency and equality indexes can be found in
Appendix B.
11.5 THINKING ABOUT TAX SYSTEM REFORMS:
AN EXERCISE FOR ITALY
At least since the end of the sixties two basic ideas have informed the debate on
tax-transfer systems reforms. The first idea is concerned with efficiency (the size
of the pie). Since the late seventies, the progressive tax systems prevailing in
most advanced economies have been criticised for giving bad incentives and
paying too high a price for income equalization. Suppose, now, that I live in a
country with a very progressive tax system and my marginal tax is 50 per cent.
Suppose I am offered 5000 euros (gross) to write a report, so that I could earn
2500 euros net of taxes. To keep things simple, let us assume I am the only one
endowed with the skills to do the job. Say I decided not to do it. But suppose
now there is a change in taxes, and from my current income level, my marginal
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tax is lowered to 20 per cent. I would now earn d4000. So this time I might
decide to do it. I would be better off. Even more importantly, the government
would now collect d1000 more from me in additional taxes, which means that
someone else down the line could also be made better off through larger
transfers or lower taxes or better public services. If policy makers believe that
such opportunities for being more productive concern mostly high-income
people, the implication is that tax rates should be made less progressive. This
basic scheme embodying the idea of improving efficiency by reducing
progressivity—together with other appealing features such as simplicity—is the
so-called ‘Flat Tax’, namely, a proportional tax. Every one pays, let us say, 20
per cent of gross income. As said above, the advocates of this reform more or
less explicitly assume that the rich are more responsive than the poor. It is
expected that the FT would lower marginal taxes for the rich and increase them
for the poor, and possibly also for average income people. To promote this as a
good reform efficiency-wise, most FT supporters tend to think that the good
incentives given to the rich outweigh the bad incentives given to the poor.
During the eighties and nineties, in particular, the United States, and most
European countries, made significant moves towards the FT by reducing the
number of brackets and/or the progressivity of the bracket marginal rates,
besides, in some cases, reducing the average tax rate (Røed and Strøm 2002).
Analyses by Hausman and associates (Hausman 1980, 1981; Burtless and
Hausman 1978; Hausman and Ruud 1984) have been very influential both
from the point of view of the political debate and from that of the evaluation
methodology. It should be added that a pure FT is equivalent to an expenditure
tax. What one says about the FT is therefore directly relevant in view of the
debate on income taxation versus expenditure taxation.
The second idea is mainly concerned with distribution. The various policies
implemented to help the poor and the needy (tax exemptions, subsidized prices,
in-kind benefits etc.) have long been criticized for being costly, chaotic and
possibly iniquitous. Maybe we can think up something more direct, simple and
transparent? Suppose you define a minimum guaranteed income. If you happen
to be above that level in your own right, that’s all right. If not, you will receive a
transfer just sufficient enough to push your income up to the guaranteed level.
On any income above the guaranteed level you will need to pay taxes
(according to some rule). This system is called ‘Negative Income Tax’ (NIT). In
the most radical formulation, the NIT mechanism replaces any other redis-
tributive policy. Between the end of the sixties and the middle of the seventies in
the United States, many econometric analyses and social experiments were
performed in order to evaluate NIT-like mechanisms.
Both ideas have a number of versions and variations. They can also be
combined. For example, we can have the NIT combined with a FT above the
guaranteed minimum income (we call this rule the NITþ FT). More recently,
especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, other NIT low-income
support mechanisms have become more fashionable, where wage subsidies to
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the working poor are used to supplement their income, or where the transfer
envisaged by the NIT is made conditional upon some minimum labor effort
(or such like, e.g. participating in a training program). These alternative income
support schemes are sometimes labeled as ‘Workfare’ (WF).
The above ideas—together with some implementations—have been circu-
lating for more than three decades as elements of the social and economic
policy debate and of the empirical economic research. During this time, the-
orists were developing sophisticated models for characterizing optimal tax
rules. The two strands of research have proceeded with very little interaction.
In what follows, we will first discuss some simulation exercises based on a
microeconometric model of household labor supply, aimed at comparing
hypothetical reforms inspired by FT or NIT or WF schemes. Then we will
discuss some further analysis where we establish an explicit connection
between microeconometric research and inquiry into optimal taxation.
Before entering the details of these exercises, we draw attention to what is
probably the easiest way to characterize the behavioral implications of the
model that we are going to use, namely computing labor supply elasticities with
respect to wages. They are computed through microsimulation, that is to say,
the wage is increased, and the individual responses are simulated and then
averaged. They are illustrated in Figures 11.6a and 6b (see p. 219), which show
marked differences among spouses and a strong inverse relation between
elasticity and household income. In a sense, it tells us that all responses come
from among the poor and average-income households and in particular from
among the women living in those households. Figures 11.6a, b must be kept in
mind as a polar star, since they suggests that:
 the effects of any simulated reform will be driven by this pattern of elasticities
 the design of an optimal—in some sense—tax rule should properly exploit
the same pattern of elasticities.
11.5.1 Comparing three reform proposals
In Italy, a consideration of the above ideas from the perspective of reforming
the tax-transfer system has emerged with some delay compared to the United
States or the United Kingdom. It is interesting to note that the fiscal plat-
forms proposed by the two coalition parties running the 2001 Italian Parlia-
mentary any elections contained reform proposals very close to the FT (Casa
delle Liberta`, right coalition), and to the NITþ FT or the WFþ FT (Ulivo, left
coalition) respectively.3 We comment here on a simulation exercise that
compares a FT, a NITþ FT and a WFþ FT rule, as an alternative to the
AQ: Please
check 11.6a
and 11.6b are
combined here.
There is no
separate
mention of 6b
further on.
3 We are making a loose analogy between theoretical schemes and actual fiscal platforms.
A more detailed and specific presentation and analysis of the platforms can be found in a CHILD
working paper by Baldini and Bosi (CHILD WP 03/2001). See also CHILD WP 03/2002 by Chiuri
and Longobardi.
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current system. Figures 11.1a–1c provide an illustration of the three systems
compared to a standard progressive rule qualitatively similar to the current
Italian one.
In order to simulate the effects of the three hypothetical reforms we use a
microeconometric model (see Appendix A) that we developed previously. The
effects are estimated using a sample of about 2200 Italian households (extracted
from the 1993 Survey of Household Income and Wealth by the Bank of Italy). It
is essentially an algorithm that allows you to compute gross and net incomes for
every household given a certain tax-transfer rule. The model takes into account
the decisions of household members: whether to work or not, and how much.
These decisions depend on various personal and family characteristics, on job
and earning opportunities and on the tax-transfer rule. In other words, it
represents, down to the micro-decisions level, the process by which the pie is
being baked and sliced. More technical details can be found in Aaberge et al.
(1998). Previous exercises applied to Italy have adopted non-behavioral
Gross income
N
et
 in
co
m
e
Gross
Actual
FT
Gross
Actual
WF
Gross
Actual
NT
Gross income
N
et
 in
co
m
e
Gross income
N
et
 in
co
m
e
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 11.1. (a) FT rule; (b) NTþ FT rule; (c) WFþ FT rule
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simulations for evaluating reforms similar to the ones mentioned above.4 When
account is not taken of behavioral responses, the dimension of the (gross) ‘cake’
is obviously fixed. However, the crucial issue in efficiency–equality evaluation
resides precisely in the possibility that the dimension (along with the distribu-
tion) of the cake may change. Less distortionary tax rates may generate a larger
amount of resources available for redistribution; a better designed redistribution
and income support system may not only foster equality but also improve the
configuration of incentives and by this route contribute in its turn to efficiency.
In this paper we use a model of household labor supply to evaluate stylized
versions of the above reform ideas. A behavioral model might reveal the pos-
sibility of improving both efficiency and equality.
Our model accounts for quantity constraints and ‘involuntary’ unemploy-
ment: for example some individuals might have a choice set that does not
contain any job opportunities, or maybe only very unattractive ones (see again
Appendix A, and the background papers for more details). Therefore not
every individual looking for a job with standard conditions will be able
to find one. On the other hand, while running the simulations, we keep the
opportunities fixed: gross wage rates and hours characterizing the various
opportunities in the choice set. In principle this is certainly a drawback,
since a different level and composition of labor supply might in turn induce a
change in wages and hours available on the market. In practice—at least in a
partial equilibrium perspective—the drawback might be minor, since the
overall changes in labor supply obtained in the simulations are sufficiently
small to assume that opportunities is constant likely to be a reasonable
approximation.5
When we simulate the working of a particular tax-transfer rule, we adjust its
parameters (for example the fixed tax rate in the case of the FT) so that the total
net tax revenue collected by the government is equal to the current one. To
simplify things, the guaranteed income level of the NITþ FT and of the
WFþ FT systems is set in advance equal to three-quarters of the poverty line
(adjusted for household size). The minimum amount of hours worked in the
year (by the household as a whole) to qualify for the transfer in the WFþ FT
system is set equal to 1000. It turns out that in order to generate the same total
4 Baldini and Bosi (2001) use a static microsimulation model to evaluate the effects on income
distribution and on net tax revenue of the two reforms contained in the electoral platforms of the
two opposed coalitions, and conclude that they both are undesirable. The (almost) flat tax
proposal—proposed by the centre-right coalition—would, according to the results of Baldini and
Bosi, entail a major loss in revenue; to keep revenue constant, an unbearably high rate would be
required. On the other hand, the ‘social dividendþ flat rate’ reform, proposed by the centre-left
coalition, would have positive effects on redistribution, but again would require an exceedingly
high flat rate to keep the revenue constant. Another example of non-behavioral simulation analysis
of this type of reforms is provided by Bourguignon et al. (1997).
5 Of course one might want to account for General Equilibrium effects. We are currently
working with Norwegian data on matching the microecoeconometric model with a Computable
General Equilibrium model (Aaberge, Colombino, Holmøy and Wennemo 2003).
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net tax revenue the three reforms require the marginal and average tax
rates reported in Table 11.2. Note that all the reforms imply a lower average
tax rate than the current system. Since the total tax revenue (the numerator) is
kept constant, the total gross income (the denominator) must have increased
and therefore household choices must have changed.
We stressed the ability of the model to represent behavior and choices, so
what are the new choices once a new tax-transfer system is implemented?
Figures 11.1–11.5 illustrate some of the results. We can summarize as follows:
(a) all three reforms bring about more (gross and net) income;
(b) the larger amount of income is due to a larger (and/or more productive)
labor supply concentrated among the low- and average-income household;
Table 11.2. Tax rates of various tax reforms
Tax rule Marginal tax rate Average tax rate
Current (1993) 27.0 (*) 20.4
FT 18.4 18.4
NITþ FT 28.4 (**) 19.5
WFþ FT 27.3 (**) 19.8
Key: (*) Marginal tax rate faced by the average income individual.
(**) Marginal tax rate faced by individuals with income above the guaranteed level.
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Figure 11.2. Labor supply (annual hours) under alternative tax reforms,
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(c) the increased labor supply is proportionally more significant among
women;
(d) the NITþ FT and the WFþ FT rules seem to escape the much feared risk of
reducing labor supply among the low-income households;
(e) all three reforms imply a more unequal household income distribution,
notably so for the FT rule.
Probably (b) and (d) are the most striking results. Result (a) supports the view
that by flattening the marginal rates profile one can obtain efficiency gains.
However (b) tells us that those gains come from an unexpected source: namely,
not the high-income households but rather the low- and average-income
households. This is clearly due to a pattern of labor supply elasticities that vary
markedly with respect to household income (and gender)—see Figures 11.6a, b.
Result (d) looks somewhat paradoxical. Take the NIT for example. From
Figures 11.1 it would seem that low-income households have lower incentive to
supply labor. This conclusion is driven by the comparison between income
when one does not work and income when one works one hour (or maybe a
few hours). However, our model takes into account that there are not many
jobs requiring one hour (or just a few hours) a year. The relevant comparison is
rather between zero hours and some significant amount of hours. Since the
average tax rate is lower under NIT than under the current rule, it may well be
the case that the incentives to supply labor to the market are reinforced, even
for the (originally) low-income households. It is worthwhile noting that the
above result would not show up with the use of a traditional model that
assumes all type of jobs are equally available. On the other hand, if the
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Figure 11.5. Gini coefficient of net household income under alternative tax reforms
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Figure 11.6. (a) Labor supply elasticity with respect to own wage by household
income decile and (b) Labor supply elasticity with respect to partner’s wage by
household income decile
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opportunity set were more uniformly dense with alternative hours, then one
should indeed expect a significant negative effect on participation from NIT-
like mechanisms. It must be added, however, that even in the last case, the effect
could be mitigated by lowering the marginal tax rate that phases out the
transfer (which is equal to 100% in the version we simulate).
A more sophisticated step consists in using welfare instead of income for
evaluating the reforms. Essentially this operation amounts to taking into
account not only income but also the value of leisure as reflected by the utility
function. Since through the model we get estimates of household utility func-
tions, we can derive the money equivalent of utility levels. Such a measure can
be used in various ways depending on whether we are willing to make inter-
household comparisons or not. If we prefer to avoid such comparisons, an
interesting application consists in identifying the households who are better off
(winners) or worse off (losers) after a reform. Figure 11.7 reports the per-
centage of winners for each reform. All three reforms bring about a majority of
winners. A tentative implication is that any of them would win against the
current system in a referendum; also, WFþ FT does better than NITþ FT,
which in turn does better than FT. The aggregate percentage of winners,
however, masks large differences between income deciles, as illustrated in
Figure 11.8. It seems that the reforms have very different distributional
implications.
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Figure 11.7. Percentage of welfare winners
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Can we put together efficiency effects and distributional effects into a syn-
thetic index? Section 11.4 and Appendix B explain how to obtain measures of
individual welfare, make them comparable, aggregate them into a social wel-
fare measure and disentangle efficiency and equality effects. A particularly
useful result is that the index of social welfare can be expressed as the product
of the average individual welfare (a measure of efficiency, the average size of
the ‘cake’) times an index of equality of the welfare distribution, which depends
on the inequality aversion parameter. For a particular value of the inequality
aversion parameter (k¼ 2) the index of equality turns out to be equal to 1—the
familiar Gini index of the welfare distribution. Figure 11.9 uses the above
criterion to illustrate the percentage variation of social welfare and of its
components under the three reforms. All reforms are more efficient than the
current system. The FT implies less equal slices. But the NITþ FT and WFþ FT
imply more equal slices. So we did find tax-transfer rules that bring about a
bigger pie and more equal slices too.
11.5.2 Looking for the best
Are there better ideas than those considered above? More generally, what’s the
best tax-transfer rule? This is the object of inquiry of a very sophisticated
branch of economic analysis, called ‘Optimal Taxation.’ This literature,
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Figure 11.8. Percentage of welfare winners by household income decile
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however, is mainly theoretical. Here we present a rather uncommon type of
inquiry, whereby an estimated empirical model (the same used in the previous
subsection) is applied to real data in order to find an optimal tax-transfer rule
according to some social welfare criterion. We limit ourselves to the class of
tax-transfer rule defined by a lump-sum transfer plus two marginal tax rates,
namely:
x ¼ c þ ð1 t1Þy if y 
y
c þ ð1 t1Þy þ ð1  t2Þðy  yÞ if y > y
(
where
c¼ lump-sum transfer
t1, t2¼marginal tax rates
x¼ disposable income
y¼ gross income
y¼ average individual gross income
We run the model (simulating the new household choices) until the social
welfare criterion also used in the previous section is maximised with respect to
c, t1 and t2 under the constraint that total net tax revenue is kept equal to the
current one. The exercise is repeated for many different values of the inequality
–1.5
–1
–0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Efficiency 2.1 0.8 1.1
Equality –1.2 0.7 0.5
Soc. Wel. 0.9 1.5 1.6
FT NIT+FT WF+FT
Figure 11.9. Reform effects on social welfare and its components
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aversion parameter. Some results are summarized in Table 11.3 at the end of
the chapter. Here we exclude negative values of c, namely, lump-sum taxes. We
just mention that by allowing lump-sum taxes the optimal tax rule turns out to
be the pure lump sum for any value of k> 0.3. At first sight the results look
rather surprising, since they imply lower marginal tax rates on higher incomes.
However notice that the rules are still progressive: the progressivity is intro-
duced through the lump-sum subsidy rather than through progressive marginal
rates. In fact, the optimal tax rules turn out to be close to NIT-like rules, where
the starting marginal rate is not necessarily 100 per cent but still significantly
lower than the next one. It is interesting to observe that this shape of the tax
Table 11.3. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable
income and taxes for married couples under alternative tax regimes by deciles of
disposable household income under 1993 taxes
Tax
regime
Decile Annual hours
of work
Households,
1000 ITL 1993
Participation
rates,
per cent
Given
participation
In the
total
population
Gross
income
Taxes Disposable
income
M F M F M F
1 95.6 14.1 1571 1030 1501 145 15221 525 14695
2 97.5 19.9 1832 1209 1787 241 24372 2109 22263
1993-tax 3–8 98.9 43.8 1991 1546 1970 677 48187 8960 39227
rules 9 99.3 65.5 2117 1731 2103 1133 85135 19983 65152
10 99.4 74.4 2237 1828 2225 1361 128396 34365 94032
All 98.5 43.7 1972 1590 1943 694 54225 11074 43150
1 95.4 19.6 1706 1264 1627 247 22933 4219 18714
2 97.8 24.4 1924 1397 1882 342 31761 5845 25917
FT 3–8 99.0 44.7 2048 1585 2027 709 54142 9961 44181
9 99.4 64.5 2162 1741 2150 1124 89459 16460 72999
10 99.5 73.2 2267 1834 2257 1344 132888 24452 108435
All 98.6 45.0 2036 1623 2008 731 60189 11074 49115
1 95.28 14.44 1551 1056 1478 152 16404 1952 18356
2 97.13 19.91 1820 1240 1768 247 26199 2537 23662
NIT 3–8 98.63 41.42 1996 1540 1969 638 49801 9538 40263
9 99.21 63.29 2138 1733 2121 1097 86985 20218 66767
10 99.49 72.59 2252 1832 2241 1331 130581 32714 97867
All 98.29 41.87 1976 1589 1942 665 55897 11074 44823
1 95.32 15.19 1621 1117 1545 170 17655 247 17902
2 97.45 20.28 1866 1285 1818 260 27280 2956 24324
WF 3–8 98.82 42.20 2018 1548 1994 653 50669 9487 41182
9 99.31 63.56 2145 1738 2130 1105 87455 19569 67885
10 99.49 72.96 2256 1833 2244 1338 131013 31538 99476
All 98.45 42.52 2001 1597 1970 679 56742 11074 45668
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rule is close enough to the ones recently computed by Saez (2001) by feeding
optimal taxation formulae into a calibrated model. The resulting rule
envisages a lump-sum transfer, high initial marginal tax rates, which then
rapidly decrease. The only important difference is, that for higher incomes,
Saez obtains marginal tax rates that increase again.
Of course, we must remember that in the simulation exercise previously
mentioned, we constrained the tax rule to contain only two marginal rates.
This was done in order to ease the computational burden. It might well be the
case that if we search within a more general class of tax rule we get a profile
even closer to Saez’s. Indeed the pattern of labor supply elasticities illustrated in
Figures 11.2 and 11.3 supports such a conjecture. The elasticity in the highest
deciles is essentially zero. Recall the argument used above to motivate the
desirability—efficiency-wise—of the FT (which also apply to NITþ FT and to
WFþ FT). Is it true that the rich are more responsive, and by working more and
exploiting better opportunities, they contribute to a bigger pie? Well, the
answer is no. Our model says that the rich hardly move: they simply collect a
larger slice thanks to lower taxes. A large part of the contribution to the bigger
pie comes instead from lower- and middle-income households (and especially
from their female members). Even though most of them face a higher marginal
tax rate, by supplying more labor they can access jobs that are better paid than
before, since the average tax rate is lower than before. The efficiency gain
attached to the FT mechanism (whether associated or not with the NIT or the
WF) apparently comes from an unexpected direction. The reforms perform
better than the current system not because they lower the marginal tax rate for
the rich, but because they lower the average tax rate, and this may also open
better opportunities for the not-so-rich and the poor. Our simulations suggest
that by flattening the tax rates profile, we do indeed have an efficiency gain.
However, the behavioral responses that generate the gains are very different
from those commonly assumed and suggest that the proposed reforms might be
improved upon by reducing progressivity, not so much in favor of the very
high-income deciles but rather in favor of the low- and average-income deciles.
Higher marginal taxes imposed on high-income brackets would simply extract
a rent and would hardly imply any loss in efficiency.6
In Appendix B, we also present an alternative social welfare function that
takes into account the so-called ‘Equality of Opportunity’ criterion. In Table 11.5
we report the results of some simulations using the EOp criterion. Income
AQ: Please
check the
table
number
6 This conjecture might turn out to need some qualification. For example it might happen that
very high marginal tax rates imposed on high incomes discourage current average income people
to jump to higher income levels. We are currently exploring the performance of more complex tax
rules. Optimising with respect to general tax rules with the use of a behavioral microeconometric
model—instead of representative agents or simple assumptions on the distribution of types as in
the theoretical literature on optimal taxation—although logically straightforward, imposes a high
computational burden.
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instead of welfare was used in this case. However we are able to compare these
results with others that also are based on income but with the standard
EO criterion. Since (comparing Table 11.4 with Table 11.5) it turns out that the
EO results are rather close, either using income or welfare, we can speculate that
the same might happen under the EOp criterion. The most striking result is that
EOp implies optimal tax-transfer rules that are much more progressive than those
implied by EO7. The result is somewhat surprising since EOp is commonly
thought to be a less interventionist philosophy with respect to EO.
A general lesson to be drawn from the above microeconometric exercises,
inspired by the optimal tax literature, is that it may make a large difference
whether one allows or not for a rich heterogeneity of response across the
population.
11.5.3 The reforms and female participation and fertility
There is a long tradition of evaluating reforms on the basis of their effects on
labor supply. A sharp departure from this tradition is done by Hausman
(1981), who notes that the welfare effects of taxes might be (and actually are in
his exercise) fairly large, notwithstanding minor behavioral effects. He
recommends that policy makers should not worry so much about labor supply
effects, and instead should focus on welfare effects. The message is important
but it should be received with some caution and flexibility. In this contribution
AQ: Kindly
check the place-
ment of tables
11.4 and 11.5
Table 11.4. EO-optimal and EOp-optimal tax rules (income based)
EO EOp
k c t1 t2 c t1 t2
1 0 0.31 0 0 0.31 0
3 0 0.31 0 0 0.11 0.35
2 0 0.31 0 2500 0.25 0.53
1 2000 0.30 0.18 12500 0.86 0.78
7 To be more precise, what we call here EOp is in fact a combination of the (pure) EOp criterion
with the EO criterion, which is applied to the distribution within the least favored group. When
k¼1, the criterion collapses to the pure EOp.
Table 11.5. EO-optimal tax rules (welfare based)
k c t1 t2
1 1000 0.37 0.00
1 1000 0.37 0.00
0.5 2740 0.37 0.13
0.4 10000 0.76 0.56
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we use a social welfare function to scale reforms since it is a theoretically
well-founded way to summarize the reform effects (actually a sort of ‘com-
pressing’ utility). However it is still useful to complement the information
compressed into a social welfare function with other details. Both the utility
function adopted in the model and the social welfare function used in the
evaluation provide only an approximation to what might be important to
the households and the policy makers. For example, the policy maker might
judge that female labor market participation per se is important for dynamic
efficiency considerations that are not fully taken into account by the model
(e.g. more participation today might imply a higher productivity tomorrow).
Fertility might also be important per se if one thinks that the number of
children is not a pure private good but rather something with public good and
externality components. What happens then to female participation and fer-
tility, under the above reforms? We have already seen the general picture
of labor supply effects of FT, NIT and WF in Figures 11.2 and 11.3.
Table 11.3 shows some more details. Overall female labor supply does not
move much. We observe a modest increase under FT and modest reductions
under NIT and WF. However, important changes are going on below this
calm surface:
 first, all the reforms induce a larger supply from the poorest deciles, and a
smaller supply from the richest deciles. Recall that all the reforms imply an
increase in the average net wage. Therefore the result can be interpreted as
due to a substitution effect prevailing among the low deciles and a wealth
effect prevailing among the high deciles. A role is probably played also by
cross-elasticities (see Fig. 11.6b). We find that labor supply from women
living in poor households increases rather elastically, not only with respect to
their own wage but also with respect to their partner’s wage. That is to say, at
low levels of household income, partners’ incomes are complements rather
than substitutes. Since as a consequence of the reforms the average net
wage increases for both partners, this reinforces incentives to participate for
women living in low-income households;
 secondly, under all reforms, household income increases much more than
(female and male) labor supply. Besides the modest increase in the average
net wage due to less progressive rates, the increase in income must therefore
be due to a change in the composition of participants. More productive
individuals move in and less productive ones move out. The process might
have some interesting implications in terms of intra-household time alloca-
tion, matching of partners and so on, that we cannot fully pursue here.
As to fertility, in principle, one could argue that child ‘production’ and care
are components of leisure and therefore induce the effects of changes in the
budget sets on fertility from basic estimates of labor supply responses. How-
ever, the model used above for reform evaluation is estimated under the
assumption that the number of children is exogenous. We can make some
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suggestive speculations based on another modeling exercise where labor supply
and number of children are both treated as simultaneous choice variables
(Colombino, 2000).8 This model does not allow a detailed representation of the
tax-transfer regime. We can only infer some implications of the reforms if we
approximate them as changes in the average tax-rate and in exogenous income.
It turns out that essentially all the three reforms can be approximated as a
lowering of the average tax rate and an increase in exogenous income. When
we feed the model with these changes, we get a slight positive effect on the
number of children, that is to say, a prevalence of the income effect (not only
the exogenous income effect, but also the income effect embodied into the wage
effect).9
APPENDIX A
Modeling household labor supply
To give a brief outline of the modeling framework we will, for expository
reasons, focus on the labor supply of single individuals. The extension to the
labor supply of married couples is however straightforward. The individuals
are assumed to choose among jobs. Each job is characterized by a wage rate w,
hours of work h and other characteristics j. Examples of these other char-
acteristics are commuting time to work, fringe benefits in terms of free parking,
hygiene, etc. The individuals are assumed to choose the job that maximizes his
or her utility, given a budget constraint that transforms gross income into net
income, and given the opportunity set of the individual. Formally, the labor
supply model looks like the following:
Max UðC, h, j; ZÞ
with respect to fh, w, jg
given,
C ¼ f ðwh, IÞ
fh, w, jg 2 S
ð1Þ
8 This other model is not completely comparable to the previous one, not only because it treats
fertility as endogenous but—among other things—because it uses an ‘average tax rate’ linear
approximation to the true budget constraint. Moreover it is a model of wife’s decisions (labor
supply and number of children), given husband’s supply decision (exogenous). However, the
dataset used and the basic methodology are similar.
9 In Colombino and Di Tommaso (1996), the own wage effect upon fertility is negative.
However, that effect is measured keeping constant the intertemporal wealth. On the other hand,
increase in intertemporal wealth (as reflected in cohort effects) due for example to increasing
wages, would have a positive effect on fertility. Therefore the results in Colombino and Di
Tommaso (1996) can be reconciled with those derived from Colombino (2000).
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Here U is the (ordinal) utility level, C is net income equal to after-tax income,
f() is a function that transforms gross income into net disposable income (i.e.
the tax-transfer rule), I is non-wage income and S is the opportunity set that the
individual faces. z is a vector that contains variables that affect preferences, like
age, number of small children etc. Some of these variables are unobserved by
the analysts. Non-working is of course an alternative. In that case h¼w¼ 0.
The opportunity set also covers non-market opportunities.
To the analyst both preferences and opportunity sets are random. At best the
analyst can derive the probability for the observed and assumed optimal choice
of the individual, that is, a job of type {h, w}. To obtain an expression for that
probability, one has to assume how the random element enters the utility
function and how this random variable, a taste-shifter, is distributed across jobs
for a given individual, and across individuals, given the job. Moreover we also
have to deal with how opportunities should be specified and how the random
elements here are distributed.
In the first place, we assume that the utility function can be factorised as:
UðC, h, j; ZÞ ¼ ðC, h, z1Þ"ðh, w, jÞ ð2Þ
where v() is the deterministic part of the utility function, Z is the vector of
observed characteristics and "() is the random variable measuring job or
household characteristics unknown to the analyst. "() is assumed to be
identical and independent, distributed across jobs and individuals. The distri-
bution function is assumed to be the extreme value distribution function of type
I. If the variance of " is infinitely large, to the analysts the choices of the
individuals seem to have been made at pure random. The economic variables
entering the deterministic part of the utility function will then explain nothing
of what we observe. At the other extreme, if the variance " is close to zero, then
to the analyst all choices made by the individuals can be explained entirely by
the deterministic part of the utility function. The individuals then make their
labor supply choice according to what maximises their deterministic utility
function. This latter extreme case is actually the approach taken in the so-called
Hausman tradition, Burtless and Hausman (1978); Hausman (1980, 1981,
1985); Blomquist (1983, 1992); Hausman and Ruud (1984); Arrufat and
Zabalza (1986). In this literature the functional form of the utility function is
specified so that hours supplied becomes a convenient function of the marginal
wage rate and of an income variable. To get a stochastic relationship, a
parameter in the corresponding deterministic utility function is assumed to be
random, with the justification that there is some unobserved heterogeneity in
the individual labor supply responses.
Next, we represent the opportunity sets by a probability density function.
One can interpret this as follows. Imagine that an individual has access to jobs
that can be given a three-dimensional description—like a box. Inside the box
there are many cells, each of them characterized by three sides, which reflect
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offered hours, the wage rate and ‘other’ attributes of a job. We assume that
the individual knows his or her ‘box’ containing job opportunities. But as
analysts we do not. The probability density representation of the opportunity
set is then like folding a wet blanket over the ‘box’. Now, there are many
individuals, each with a different number of available jobs and of different
types. The best skilled may have a much bigger ‘opportunity box’ to choose
from than the less skilled. To capture this, we represent the choice set S by
imposing a probability density on the choice set S. Let p(h, w; q) denote the
probability density of jobs of type (h, w). q is a vector of observed variables,
like education and working experience, which reflects that the opportunities
of individuals differ. The q-variables affect the moments in the probability
distribution.
Our representation of opportunities allows for the fact that jobs with offered
hours in a certain range are more likely to be found than other jobs. The
clustering of offered hours in certain intervals may be due to the production
technology of firms (in car production the workers have to be together at the
same time, they cannot come and go as the wish), or due to the outcome of
negotiations between employers and employee organisations. Many indi-
viduals are observed to rush to and from work at the same time. It would be
strange to assume that this is due to preferences.
Moreover, our representation of opportunities also allows for wages to
vary across jobs for the same individual. In the ‘Hausman approach’, and
also in studies closer to ours such as Dickens and Lundberg (1993) and van
Soest (1995), the individual has a fixed wage rate. Thus in these studies
human capital endowments of the individual determine entirely his or her
wage rate. This does not accord with more recent labor market theories, in
which job-specific wage rates are due to efficient wages and wages determined
in negotiations between the employers and employee associations. Wage
dispersion among observationally identical workers seems also to be
empirically supported (Krueger and Summers 1988 and Edin and Zetterberg
1992).
We observe the chosen h and w. From the assumptions made above, we can
derive the probability of the chosen job with these characteristics, (h, w).
Let ’(h, w; I, z1, q) denote this probability and let us use the definition
(C, h; z1)¼ (f(wh, I), h; z1)¼ (h, w; z1). Then we obtain:
’ðh, w; I, z1qÞ ¼  ðh, w; I, z1Þpðh, w; qÞP
x0
P
y0  ðx, y; I, z1Þpðx, y; qÞ
ð3Þ
For the proof we refer to Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999).
Expression (3) is analogous to a multinomial logit model with the excep-
tion that the deterministic part of the outcome function of a particular
choice, (f(wh, I), h; z) is weighted by the probability density of jobs with the
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characteristics (h, w), i.e. by p(h, w; q). The intuition behind expression (3) is
that the probability of the optimal choice, ’(h, w; I, z1, q), can be expressed as
the relative attractiveness of jobs of type (h, w), weighted by a measure of how
available this type of job is, i.e. by p(h, w; q). To proceed with estimation one
has to specify the functional form of the deterministic part of the utility
function, that is, the functional form of v, and hence  , and the probability
density p(h, w; q).
With regard to the functional form of the utility function we have
employed (in all works referred to above) a rather flexible functional form.
Depending on the value of the parameters, the deterministic part of the
utility function can be linear in consumption and leisure as well as log-linear in
these two variables. Moreover, again depending on the parameters, it also
allows for a labor supply that is backward bending. The latter means
that the higher the wage rate is, the less the labor supply will be. If so,
the income effects dominate over the substitution effects. In fact, the func-
tional form specification allows for the responses on wage rate to vary a lot
across individuals, depending on their economic situation (the magnitude
of w and I) and the characteristics z1. The functional form can also yield a
linear labor supply curve. As mentioned above, this is the only form that the
Hausman approach applies. The problem with a labor supply curve, which is
linear in the wage rate is that by assumption the labor supply elasticity tends to
increase with the wage rate. The linearity assumption thus implies that the
more highly skilled, with high wage rates, are more responsive than those with
lower skills, and hence lower wage rates (see Røed and Strøm (2002) for further
discussion).
In the specification of the probability density of opportunities, we will
assume that offered hours and offered wages are independently distributed.
The justification for this is that offered hours, in particular normal working
hours, are typically set in rather infrequent negotiations between employers
and employee associations, while wage negotiations are far more frequent in
which the hourly wage tends to be set independently of working hours. Offered
hours are assumed to be uniformly distributed, except for hours related to full-
time jobs. Thus, this opportunity density for offered hours implies that it is far
more likely to find jobs with hours that accord with a full-time position than
jobs with other working loads. To account for the fact that the availability of
any job at all may vary across, say, regions, the proportion of market oppor-
tunities may depend on where the individual lives for example, in the north or
the south of Italy. The wage rate is assumed to be lognormal distributed, with
the expectation depending on individual characteristics.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into detail about specifications of
the model, estimation methods and estimation results. Instead we refer to
Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) and Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and
Wennemo (2000), where the modeling and estimation method is explained and
where empirical results for labor supply among married couples in Italy are
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given. In Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2000) similar estimation result for
Norway, Sweden and Italy are also given and compared.
APPENDIX B
Social welfare functions
The standard approach in evaluating tax systems is to employ a social evalu-
ation or welfare function as the basic evaluating instrument. This function is
commonly used to summarize the changes in (adult-equivalent) income/welfare
resulting from introducing various alternatives to the actual tax system in a
country. The simplest way to summarize the changes that take place is to add
up the income/welfare differentials, implying that individuals are given equal
weights in the social welfare function independently of whether they are poor
or rich. However, if besides total welfare we also care about the distributional
consequences of a tax system, then an alternative to the linear additive welfare
function is required. In this study we rely on the rank-dependent social welfare
functions that have their origin in Mehran (1976) and Yaari (1988),10 and are
defined by:
Wk ¼
Xn
i¼1
pk
i
n
 
XðiÞ k ¼ 1, 2, . . . ð4Þ
where Xð1Þ  Xð2Þ      XðnÞ are the ordered income (or—more generally—
welfare) levels of a sample of size n of the population, and pkði=nÞ is a positive
decreasing weight function.11 A preliminary problem to solve consists in
computing income or welfare measures that can be compared across house-
holds. We use money-metric utility measures as explained in King (1983) and
Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2001). The inequality aversion exhibited by
Wk decreases with increasing k. As k!1, Wk approaches inequality neutrality
and coincides with the linear additive welfare function defined by:
W1 ¼ 1
n
Xn
i¼1
XðiÞ ð5Þ
10 Several authors have discussed rationales for this approach, see e.g. Sen (1974), Hey and
Lambert (1980), Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and
Gilboa (1992) and Aaberge (2001).
11
pkðtÞ ¼
log t, k ¼ 1
k
k  1 ð1  t
k1Þ, k ¼ 2, 3, . . .
8<:
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It follows by straightforward calculation that WkW1 for all k and that Wk is
equal to the mean W1 for finite k if, and only if, the distribution function is the
egalitarian distribution. Thus, Wk can be interpreted as the equally distributed
level of income (or welfare). As recognised by Yaari (1988) this property
suggests that Ik, defined by:
Ik ¼ 1 
Wk
W1
, k ¼ 1, 2, . . . ð6Þ
can be used as a summary measure of inequality. Actually, I1 is equivalent to a
measure of inequality that was proposed by Bonferroni (1930), while I2 is the
Gini coefficient.12
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AS A BENCHMARK FOR
EVALUATION OF SOCIAL POLICY
For a given sum of income, the standard social welfare functions take their
maximum value when everyone gets the same income and may thus be inter-
preted as equality of outcome (EO) criteria when employed as measures for
judging between alternative policy regimes, for example tax systems. However,
as indicated by Roemer (1998) the EO-criterion is controversial and suffers
from the drawback of receiving little support among citizens in a nation.13 This
is simply due to the fact that differences in outcomes resulting from differences
in efforts are in general considered ethically acceptable and thus should not be
the target of a redistribution policy. An egalitarian redistribution policy should
instead seek to equalize those income differentials for which the individuals
should not be held responsible, because they were beyond their control.
Problematic life conditions or events—whether concerning employment,
health, housing etc.—typically originate from a mixture of bad opportunities,
bad luck and ‘wrong’ decisions. Social policies can affect the number and the
quality of opportunities, the probability of unlucky events, and also the
appropriateness of decision-making by providing information upon available
choices, and counseling on good procedures for learning and processing
information. In order to design good social policies one has to disentangle as far
as possible the contribution of opportunities, chance, preferences and decision-
making ability to the individual labor market successes. Thus, not only the
outcome, but its origin and how it was obtained, matters. This is the essential
idea behind Roemer’s (1998) theory of equality of opportunity where people
are supposed to differ with respect to ‘circumstances’. Circumstances are
attributes of the environment of the individual that influence the earnings
12 For further discussion of the family {Ik: k¼1, 2, . . . } of inequality measures we refer to
Mehran (1976), Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Bossert (1990) and Aaberge (2000,
2001).
13 See also Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989) and Roemer (1993).
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potential of the individual, and which are ‘beyond his control’. Thus, as distinct
from the standard utilitarian EO approach, Roemer’s (1998) EOp approach is
non-‘welfarist’; one needs to know the efforts expended by the individuals, and
not simply the outcomes they enjoy under them.
Assume that Xtði=ntÞ is the income (or welfare) level of the individual with
rank i in the income distribution of type t, where:
i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , nt and t ¼ 1, 2, . . . , r,
i:e: Xt
1
nt
 
 Xt 2
nt
 
     Xt nt1
nt
 
 Xð1Þ for t ¼ 1, 2, . . . , r
The differences in incomes within each type are assumed to be due to
different degrees of effort for which the individual is to be held responsible,
whereas income differences that may be traced back to circumstances are
considered to be beyond the control of the individual. As indicated by Roemer
(1998) this suggests that we may measure a person’s effort by the quantile or
relative rank (i/nt) of the income distribution where he is located. Next, Roemer
declares that two individuals in different types have expended the same
degree of effort if they have identical relative positions (relative rank) in the
income distribution of their type. Thus, an EOp (Equality of Opportunity)
tax policy should aim at designing a tax system such that is mint XtðqÞ
maximised for each quantile q. However, since this criterion is rather
demanding and in most cases will not produce a complete ordering of the tax
systems, a weaker ranking criterion is required. To this end Roemer (1998)
proposes to employ as the social evaluation function the average of the lowest
income at each quantile,
fW1 ¼ 1
mint nt
X
q
min
t
XtðqÞ ð7Þ
Thus, fW1 ignores income differences within types and is solely concerned
about differences that arise from differential circumstances. By contrast, the
EO criteria defined by (4) does not distinguish between the different sources
that contribute to income inequality. As an alternative to (4) and (7) we
introduce the following extended family of EOp welfare functions,
fWk ¼X
q
pkðqÞmint XtðqÞ ð8Þ
where pk(q) is defined by (5).
The essential difference between fWk and fW1 is that fWk gives increasing
weight to the welfare of lower quantiles in the type-distributions. Thus,
in this respect fWk captures also an aspect of inequality within types. As
explained above, the concern for within type inequality is greatest for the most
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disadvantaged type, that is, for the type that forms the largest segment(s) of
fmint XtðqÞ : q 2 ½0, 1g.
We may decompose the EOp welfare functions, fWk, as we did with the EO
welfare functions Wk. Accordingly, we have that
fWk ¼ fW1ð1~IkÞ, k ¼ 1, 2, . . . ð9Þ
where ~Ik defined by
~Ik ¼ 1
fWkfW1 , k ¼ 1, 2, . . . ð10Þ
is a summary measure of inequality for the mixture distribution ~F.
Expression (9) demonstrates that the EOp welfare functions fWk for k<1 take
into account value judgments about the trade-off between the mean income
and the inequality in the distribution of income for the most EOp dis-
advantaged people. Thus, fWk may be considered as an inequality within a type
adjusted version of the pure EOp welfare function that was introduced by
Roemer (1998). As explained above, the concern for within type inequality is
greatest for the most disadvantaged type, that is, for the type that forms the
largest segment(s) of the mixture distribution ~F. Alternatively, fWk for k<1
may be interpreted as an EOp welfare function that, in contrast to fW1, gives
increasing weight to individuals who occupy low effort quantiles.
Note that the EOp criterion was originally interpreted as more acceptable—
from the point of view of individualistic conservative societies. Our extended
EOp welfare functions can be considered as a mixture of the EO welfare
functions and the pure EOp welfare function; they are concerned about
inequality between types as well as inequality within the worst-off distribution.
EOp looks at what happens to the distribution formed by the most dis-
advantaged segments of the intersecting type-specific distributions. Moreover,
the pure version of the criterion only looks at the mean of the worst-off dis-
tribution. By contrast, EO takes into account the whole income distribution.
For a given sum of incomes, EO will consider equality of income (everyone
receives the same income) as the most desirable income distribution. The
pure EOp will instead consider equality in mean incomes across types as
the ultimate goal. Since the extended EOp combines these two criteria, trans-
fers that reduce the differences in the mean incomes between types as well as
the income differentials between the individuals within the worst-off distri-
bution are considered equalizing by the extended EOp. Thus, in the case of a
fixed total income also the extended EOp will consider equality of income as
the most desirable distribution. However, by transferring money from the most
advantaged type to the most disadvantaged type, EOp inequality may be
reduced. Whether it is more ‘efficient’ to reduce inequality between or within
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types, depends on the specific situation. When labor supply responses to
taxation are taken into account, the composition of types in the worst-off
distribution will change and depend on the chosen welfare function ðfWkÞ as
well as on the considered tax rule. Thus, the large heterogeneity in labor supply
responses to tax changes that is captured by our model(s) makes it impossible to
state anything on EOp- or EO-optimality before the simulation exercises have
been completed.
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